1. The unrelenting violence in Syria has resulted in thousands of deaths, untold 

thousands of wounded, detained and disappeared, and physical destruction on a 

massive scale. Hundreds of thousands have fled their homes and those that remain 

struggle to secure basic necessities. World heritage sites have been damaged or 

destroyed, as have entire neighbourhoods. Civilians have borne the brunt of 

escalating armed confrontations as the front lines between Government forces and 

the armed opposition have moved deeper into urban areas. The patterns of 

international human rights and humanitarian law violations that were noted in 

previous reports have continued unabated, alongside a proliferation of both anti- 

and pro-Government armed entities. 

2. On 28 September 2012 the Human Rights Council (HRC) extended the mandate of 

the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 

(the Commission), requesting it to investigate all massacres and continue to update 

its mapping exercise of gross violations of human rights since March 2011.  The 

HRC also requested the Commission to investigate allegations of war crimes and 

crimes against humanity. Updates of the Commission’s findings with respect to 

such violations are to be released periodically.  

3. This periodic update covers the period 28 September to 16 December 2012.  

II. Military situation 

4. The Syrian conflict has been marked by a continuous but unequal escalation of 

armed violence throughout the country. Levels of violence have varied 

geographically due to the interplay of a number of factors:  the strategic importance 

of a particular area, the deployment and strength of Government forces, the 2 

sectarian composition of the local population and anti-Government armed groups’ 

organisation and access to logistical support.  

5. In the southern governorates of Dara’a, al-Suweida  and al-Qunayterah, 

Government forces remain in control of main localities. This is due to the heavy 

presence of army units and security services, together with the existence of 

relatively disorganised and poorly armed anti-Government groups in these areas. In 

comparison to groups based in the north-west, armed groups in the southern 

governorates have struggled to establish themselves and are able only to briefly 

attack isolated checkpoints and individuals. In these areas, the army is still able to 

set up checkpoints and conduct targeted raids inside restive towns.  

6. Reports from northern and central provinces describe a different reality, with antiGovernment armed groups exercising control over large swathes of territory. 

Armed groups in governorates such as Idlib, Latakia and Aleppo have been able to 

coordinate effectively, both with each other and with unified local military 

councils. Further, they are equipped with increasingly efficient military assets 

allowing them to mount a serious challenge to the Government forces’ authority.  

7. Violence has increased dramatically in and around major cities, in particular 

Damascus and Aleppo, where anti-Government fighters have advanced to 

neighbourhoods close to the cities’ centres. Anti-Government armed groups were 

also reported in governorates such as al-Raqqah and al-Hasakah where they have 

clashed with army units, provoking shelling and artillery attacks.  

8. Mounting tensions have led to armed clashes between different armed groups along 

a sectarian divide (see Section III). Such incidents took place in mixed 

communities or where armed groups had attempted to  take hold of areas 

predominantly inhabited by pro-Government minority communities. Some minority 

communities, notably the Alawites and Christians, have formed armed self-defence 

groups to protect their neighbourhoods from anti-Government fighters by 

establishing checkpoints around these areas. Some of those local groups, known as 

Popular Committees, are said to have participated alongside Government forces in 

military operations in Damascus countryside in Tadamon and Said al-Zeinab 

neighbourhoods. Interviewees alleged that the Government provided arms and 

uniforms to these groups. 

9. During the last two months, anti-Government armed groups have reached strategic 

regions and were able to challenge state forces control of sensitive infrastructure 

such as oil fields, major highways, airports and military camps. The armed groups 

have increasing access to weaponry, though those in the south tend to be less wellarmed. Most anti-Government armed groups are equipped with individual light 

weapons and small arms, typical to any insurgency,  including Rocket Propelled 3 

Grenades (RPGs) of different calibres and types. The larger armed groups possess 

mortars, heavy machine guns and heavy anti-aircraft machine guns. A few have 

obtained anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. The  quality and quantity of such 

missiles appear to be limited but would be sufficient to affect Government forces 

use of air assets. While significant quantities of arms were taken from army camps, 

weapons and ammunition have also been smuggled in from neighbouring countries.  

10. Interviews with fighters, including some defectors, indicate that newly formed 

armed opposition groups are less likely to attach themselves to the Free Syrian 

Army (FSA). Many operate independently from existing groups or are affiliated to 

Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Foreign fighters, many of whom also have 

links to other extremist groups, are present in Idlib, Latakia and Aleppo 

governorates. Multiple interviewees noted that while these groups are independent 

of the FSA, they coordinate attacks with them. 

11. Government forces, along with supporting militia, have tried to adapt their 

deployment, tactics and capabilities to those of the armed groups. They are 

focussing now on securing control of main cities –  particularly Aleppo and 

Damascus – while limiting their actions in the countryside to shelling and aerial 

attacks. There are fewer accounts of Government forces engaging in ground 

actions. Rather they continue shelling areas under  anti-Government armed group 

control, endangering civilians who remain in these areas. Interviewees stated that 

joint pro-Government forces are conducting house-to-house searches in 

neighbourhoods used by the opposition such as Daraya in Damascus countryside 

and Mashari’a al-Arbaeen in Hama city. Government forces continue to besiege 

opposition strongholds in the central region of the country and reinforce borders 

with Lebanon and Jordan in an attempt to limit flows of weapons and people.  

III. Increased sectarianism 

12. The risk of the Syrian conflict devolving from peaceful protests seeking political 

reform to a confrontation between ethnic and religious groups has been ever 

present. As battles between Government forces and anti-Government armed groups 

approach the end of their second year, the conflict has become overtly sectarian in 

nature. 

13. In recent months, there has been a clear shift in how interviewees portray the 

conflict. In describing the shelling of a village in Latakia governorate by 

Government forces, one interviewee stressed that the shelling came from positions 

in "Alawite villages”. Another interviewee, describing ground attacks in Bosra in 

the southern Dara’a governorate, stated that tensions between the Shia and Sunni 

communities in the town were "escalating”, with violence becoming increasingly 

inevitable. 4 

14. The country’s other minority groups, such as the Armenians, Christians, Druze, 

Palestinians, Kurds and Turkmen (see Section IV), have been drawn into the 

conflict.  However, the sectarian lines fall most sharply between Syria’s Alawite 

community, from which most of the Government’s senior political and military 

figures hail, and the country’s majority Sunni community who are broadly (but not 

uniformly) in support of the anti-Government armed groups.  

15. Attacks and reprisals (and fears thereof) have led  to communities arming 

themselves, and being armed by parties to the conflict. One interviewee, a Turkman 

living in Latakia, captured the situation succinctly: "it is too dangerous to live 

beside neighbours who are armed and [consider you to be a rebel], while you 

yourself remain unarmed”.  

16. Government forces and militias aligned with the Government have attacked Sunni 

civilians. One interviewee, present in Bosra in late October, described "members of 

the Shia militia”, whom she recognised from the neighbourhood, conducting house 

searches. She stated that the militia told her that "they would kill all Sunnis in the 

region and that the area belonged to them”. Another interviewee stated that he 

regularly witnessed Sunni commuters being pulled out of their cars and beaten at 

army checkpoints along the main highway between Dara’a and Damascus. 

17. The Commission has received credible reports of anti-Government armed groups 

attacking Alawites and other pro-Government minority communities. One 

interviewee, an FSA fighter in Latakia, detailed how, upon capturing Government 

forces, the Sunni captives were imprisoned while Alawites were immediately 

executed. On 30 October, a bomb exploded near an important Shia shrine outside 

of Damascus, killing and injuring several people. On 6 November, a car bomb 

exploded in the Alawite neighbourhood of Hai al-Wuroud in the north-west of 

Damascus, reportedly killing ten people. 

18. Most of the foreign fighters filtering into Syria to join the anti-Government armed 

groups (or to fight independently alongside them) are Sunnis hailing from countries 

in the Middle East and North Africa. The increasingly sectarian nature of the 

conflict provides one motivation for other actors to enter into the conflict. The 

Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah has confirmed that its members are in Syria 

fighting on behalf of the Government. There have also been reports, still under 

investigation, of Iraqi Shias coming to fight in Syria. Iran confirmed on 14 

September that members of its Revolutionary Guards  are in Syria providing 

"intellectual and advisory support”.  

19. One expatriate interlocutor working inside Syria described a "low intensity 

sectarian conflict” taking place alongside the fight against the Government. The 5 

dangers are evident. Entire communities are at risk of being forced out of the 

country or of being killed inside the country. With communities believing – not 

without cause – that they face an existential threat, the need for a negotiated 

settlement is more urgent than ever. 

IV. Minority groups in the conflict 

20. Feeling threatened and under attack, ethnic and religious minority groups have 

increasingly aligned themselves with parties to the conflict, deepening sectarian 

divides.  

21. Syria’s Armenian Orthodox, other Christian, and Druze communities have sought 

protection by aligning themselves with the Government, with the consequence that 

they have come under attack from anti-Government armed groups.  

22. The Armenian Orthodox community resides mainly in Aleppo governorate. On 16 

September, ten passengers on a bus travelling from  Beirut to Aleppo were 

kidnapped. All ten were Christian, with seven being Armenian Orthodox. Their 

whereabouts remain unknown. On the same day, the Saint Kevork Armenian 

Church in Aleppo was heavily damaged. Syrians of Armenian descent have sought 

refuge in Armenia. 

23. Christian communities are spread throughout Syria, with the largest communities, 

prior to the conflict, living in Aleppo, Damascus and Homs governorates. Homs 

city had been home to approximately 80,000 Christians, most of whom have now 

fled reportedly to Damascus, with some then making  their way to Beirut. It is 

estimated that only a few hundred remain. An interviewee, speaking about recent 

events in al-Suweida governorate, confirmed that the Sunni and Druze 

communities had clashed, leaving several dead. On 29 October, a car bomb 

exploded outside a bakery in Jaramana, a predominantly Christian and Druze 

neighbourhood in Damascus. 

24. Half a million Palestinian refugees live in Syria.  A third reside in the Yarmouk 

refugee camp in Damascus. Divisions within the community hardened after 

February 2012, when Hamas broke with the Government. Reports reviewed by the 

Commission indicate that Palestinians in Yarmouk are being armed by both the 

Government and the anti-Government armed groups. 

25. On 5 November, approximately 20 Palestinians were killed and over 70 injured 

during a mortar attack on Yarmouk. Both the Government forces and the antiGovernment armed groups have accused each other of firing the mortars. On the 

same day, the body of Mohammed Rafeh, a prominent Syrian-born Palestinian who 

had been outspoken in his support of President Assad, was returned to his family 6 

bearing gunshots to the head and upper body. A group named "Ahfad al-Siddiqi” 

claimed responsibility for the killing.

26. Following airstrikes on Yarmouk on 16 December, which reportedly killed and 

injured dozens of residents, damaged a mosque and left the camp devastated, the 

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) denounced the Assad Government. The 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command continues to 

support the Government. 

27. The Kurds, who live predominantly in the north-eastern al-Hasakah governorate, 

have remained relatively autonomous due to their fighting ability and independent 

supply lines. They have clashed with Government forces and anti-Government 

armed groups over control of territory. Hostilities flared between Kurdish militias 

and the anti-Government armed groups on 25 October  in Aleppo, following the 

armed groups’ attempt to enter the Kurdish-held Sheikh Maqsud neighbourhood. 

Fighting continued until 5 November, when a truce was signed. On 19 November, 

anti-Government armed groups attacked a Kurdish militia checkpoint in Ras alAyn, leaving six rebels dead. An anti-Government sniper also assassinated Abed 

Khalil, the president of the local Kurdish council. Four Kurdish fighters were later 

executed after being captured by anti-Government fighters. 

28. Turkmen militias fight as part of the anti-Government armed groups in Latakia 

governorate. Several Turkmen civilians have emphasised the discrimination their 

community suffered under the Government. Interviewees also emphasised that the 

decision to bear arms was influenced in part by the creation of Alawite militias in 

surrounding villages, and the fact that Turkmen were being harassed at checkpoints 

and during house searches.  

V. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 

Unlawful killing and ‘massacres’ 

29. In addition to investigating summary executions and violations of the right to life 

generally, under its extended mandate the Commission is also investigating 

massacres. 

30. Investigations continue regarding reports that pro-Government forces are 

unlawfully killing armed and unarmed persons suspected of opposing the 

Government.  Accounts from Latakia indicate that  Shabbiha arrest and torture, 

including torturing to death, suspected opposition  members. Incidents in Asfira 

(September) and al-Basit (August) fitting this pattern are under investigation. 

31. Although fewer credible accounts were received of Government soldiers executing 

captives, incidents of direct targeting of civilians by aerial bombardment, including 7 

"barrel bombs,” rocket attacks and machine gun fire have risen significantly. The 

Commission recorded a large number of incidents in several governorates where 

multiple civilian casualties resulted from shelling by Government forces. The 

evidence in many of these cases indicates that Government forces take insufficient 

precautions to avoid incidental loss of civilian life and that their attacks are 

disproportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 

Investigations are on-going as to whether these attacks are indiscriminate and 

violate the law of armed conflict. 

32. Consistent accounts of summary executions by anti-Government armed groups 

continue to be collected. Unlawful executions of captured Government soldiers in 

Aleppo (10 September), Sabouk (2 November) and Ras  al-Ayn (29 November), 

where the unarmed captives were gathered together and then gunned down, are 

under investigation. Investigations indicate that in some instances captured enemy 

fighters are brought before a Sharia council (al-Lajana al-Shariah) prior to their 

execution. Neither the substantive nor procedural framework of these councils 

could be ascertained, with one interviewee positing that, "only those with blood on 

their hands” are executed. It is a war crime to sentence or execute a person who has 

been captured, has surrendered, is injured or is otherwise hors de combat, without 

due process. 

33. The use of snipers has become a pronounced feature of the urban insurgency fought 

by both Government and anti-Government armed groups, positioned in strategic 

areas to freeze the frontlines and hinder movement. Civilians caught in between are 

exposed, vulnerable to the constant risk of being hit by snipers. Several interviews 

describe civilians, particularly in Aleppo city, being killed by sniper fire. There are 

also recorded accounts of women and children victims with injuries that indicate 

they were shot by snipers while going about their daily routine. Several credible 

accounts concern civilian victims in Latakia who came under sniper fire while 

collecting milk in the morning. One woman was hit adjusting the television antenna 

on the roof of her house. Similar accounts were recorded elsewhere. 

Torture 

34. Considerable evidence has been collected regarding the use of torture, particularly 

in Government-run detention centres in Damascus.  The testimony of interviewees 

indicates a consistent and systematic pattern of torture during which individuals are 

beaten and subjected to electric shocks while held  in overcrowded, underground 

cells. One victim who had been detained in Harasta Intelligence Branch outside of 

Damascus for 30 days, had his genitals electrocuted on multiple occasions. Another 

interviewee, a former guard of Harasta prison, described how his superiors 

encouraged the ill-treatment of detainees. Testimony was also gathered indicating 

that children were held in Harasta Intelligence Branch in the same detention areas 

and conditions as adults and were also tortured. 8 

35. An interviewee, arrested in August while distributing bread in one of the northern 

governorates, was handed over to Military Security, who beat him, asking "where 

are you taking this bread? Were you taking it to the FSA?” After five days of 

torture and detention without food or water, the interviewee reported, "I couldn't 

move my leg or stand up, I reached the point where I wished I could die.” The 

interviewee was transferred through a prison in Homs and then to Military Security 

Branch 215 in Damascus where for two weeks he was kept in an underground cell 

of 4 by 5 metres with 60 other detainees. Multiple accounts have been collected of 

torture occurring in Military Security Branch 215,  including the use of torture 

methods such as hanging from the ceiling by wrists (shabeh) and beaten inside a 

tyre (dulab). The consistency among the various accounts lends them significant 

credibility.  

36. In Latakia, interviewees described a pattern of  shabbiha conduct. In manning 

checkpoints to majority-Alawite villages, shabbiha often arrest, harass and torture 

individuals suspected of cooperating with the opposition, detain them or hand them 

over to Air Force and Military Security Intelligence organs.  

37. Accounts were also received of torture by anti-Government armed groups, 

documenting an FSA-administered detention centre in Sahara, Aleppo where 

detainees were tortured and killed. In Seida al-Zeinab in Damascus, FSA members 

reportedly captured, interrogated and beat a suspected Hezbollah member.  

Attacks on protected objects  

38. Increasing attacks on cultural property as well as the use of protected objects for 

military purposes by all parties to the conflict have been recorded. Available 

information indicates that Syria’s six World Heritage sites have been damaged in 

the fighting.  In Aleppo, the historic souk was burned (1 October), the Umayyad 

mosque was significantly damaged (14 October), and the Saint Kevork Church (29 

October) was damaged by arsonists. The doors of the Aleppo Citadel were also 

damaged in August, while looters have broken into one of the world’s bestpreserved Crusader castles, Krak des Chevaliers. Artefacts in museums in Palmyra, 

Bosra and Homs have also been looted while ruins in the ancient city of Palmyra 

have been damaged.  

39. Interviewees described Government forces’ shelling  of state hospitals as well as 

field hospitals in opposition-controlled areas. Multiple interviewees described the 

shelling of hospitals in Aleppo governorate, in Aleppo city and the towns of Hirtan 

and El Bab. Dar al-Shifa, the main emergency hospital in Aleppo city, has been 

shelled on multiple occasions leading to its destruction. Investigations are on-going 

about the potential misuse of the hospitals at the  time of attacks, the possible 9 

presence of legitimate military targets nearby, and whether adequate warnings were 

given prior to attack. 

40. Attacking protected objects is a war crime, while using protected objects for 

military purposes violates customary international  humanitarian law in noninternational armed conflict. 

Use of cluster munitions 

41. The use of cluster munitions in populated urban areas is currently under 

investigation. Syria is not party to the international Convention on Cluster 

Munitions which prohibits such use. Where the object of an attack was the civilian 

population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, the 

investigation will seek to verify the occurrence of the war crime of attacking 

civilians. Whether the use of cluster munitions was indiscriminate is also being 

assessed. 

VI. Impact on the civilian population 

42. Investigation into the conduct of hostilities of the parties to the conflict in Syria is 

on-going. Certain attacks are of particular concern, particularly those that inflict 

terror upon civilians seeking to obtain basic necessities.  

43. The evidence collected indicates that anti-Government armed groups consistently 

fail to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. The obligation on each 

party to the conflict, under customary international law, to remove civilian persons 

and objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives is 

particularly relevant where military objectives cannot feasibly be separated from 

densely populated areas. The manifest failure to make these distinctions has 

resulted in civilians being driven from their homes and contributed to the alarming 

increase of IDPs and refugees.  

44. Faced with shelling and shortages of food, water and fuel, civilians have fled their 

homes, becoming refugees in neighbouring countries  or finding themselves 

internally displaced. Towns and villages across Latakia, Idlib, Hama and Dara’a 

governorates have been effectively emptied of their populations. Entire 

neighbourhoods in southern and eastern Damascus, Deir al-Zour and Aleppo have 

been razed. The downtown of Homs city has been devastated. 

45. The humanitarian situation in Syria has deteriorated rapidly during the reporting 

period. Many of those interviewed detailed the difficulty in obtaining food, potable 

water and fuel. This appears to be particularly acute in Idlib, Latakia and in 

northern Aleppo governorates. In Aleppo city, and among much of the north of 

Syria, electricity has been cut off, food is no longer readily available and access to 10 

medical care or assistance is severely limited. In Idlib, an interviewee described 

how in addition to the shelling, the living conditions in the town of Hass had 

become unbearable, aggravated by a lack of fuel and domestic gas, frequent 

electricity and water cuts, and skyrocketing food prices of basic products such as 

bread. The situation in Latakia, according to multiple accounts, has become so dire 

that entire villages that are home to the Turkmen community have been emptied. 

Investigations are seeking to establish whether such shortages are deliberate and 

part of an intentional and concerted siege, or whether they are a direct, albeit 

unintended, consequence of protracted armed conflict. 

46. In certain areas, the humanitarian situation has been aggravated by widespread 

destruction and razing of residential areas. According to the Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), many internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) in Syria are unable to return to their homes because they have been 

destroyed. The onset of winter poses particular risk to such vulnerable groups. 

Numbers of refugees are expected to swell in the coming months to over 700,000, 

while there are already 2 million IDPs according to the latest OCHA figures. 

VII.   Conclusion  

47. The war of attrition that is being fought in Syria  has brought immeasurable 

destruction and human suffering to the civilian population. As the conflict drags on, 

the parties have become ever more violent and unpredictable, which has led to their 

conduct increasingly being in breach of international law. The sole way to bring 

about an immediate cessation of the violence is through a negotiated political 

settlement which meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. The 

Commission strongly supports the mission of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Joint 

Special Representative of the United Nations and League of Arab States in its 

effort to bring the parties towards such a settlement.